We estimate an option-based value of a fund manager's conditional market timing skill in bear market states. We combine this value with alpha based estimates of selection skill to give an overall valuation of active management. At the aggregate level, we estimate that the benefit arising from the option value of active fund management in bad times can be large enough to cover its unconditional overall cost. Our analysis suggests that by taking account of the option premium delivered by managers' bear market timing skills, the longstanding mutual fund underperformance puzzle could be largely rationalized.
Introduction
Does the actively managed mutual fund industry destroy value? Would the typical investor's overall welfare increase if his or her portfolio were moved to passively managed funds? A significant mutual fund literature documents negative alphas relative to passive benchmarks and show that the cost of active management appears to far exceed its benefit (e.g., French 2008 , Lewellen 2011 These data seem to stand at odds with theory such as Berk and Green (2004) , where equilibrium in efficient markets should imply aggregate expected alpha that is positive gross of fees and zero net of them.
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On the other hand, Moskowitz (2000) , Staal (2006) and Kosowski (2011) find that mutual fund managers tend to perform better than passive benchmarks in bad times, and argue that the value added by active management may have been largely underestimated.
Kacperczyk, Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2014) We implement a novel approach to estimating the value of actively managed mutual funds' conditional stock selection and market timing skills in bear states. Building on Merton (1981)'s insight on the call option character of a manager's market timing ability and extending his formula, we estimate the value of a fund manager's conditional performance as the sum of the option value of the manager's timing skill in bear states plus the conditional alpha as a measure of selectivity skill. 3 In contrast to recent evidence suggesting that the positive conditional performance is due to managers' countercyclical stock selection skills (e.g., Kosowski 2011, Glode 2011), our estimates highlight the relative importance of the option value of market timing success. This result would be consistent with Kacperczyk, Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2014) .
The other significant research question whether this option-based valuation of enhanced performance in bad times can be large enough to compensate for the cost of lower unconditional alphas. To investigate, we compute option-adjusted alphas against typical passive k-factor benchmarks. The unadjusted aggregate 4-factor alpha of our sample is large and negative, −0.08% per month (t-stat=−2.78). In stark contrast, we find the option-adjusted alpha is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This finding suggests that the benefit of the service provided by fund managers may actually fall in line with its cost, consistent with predictions of Moskowitz (2000) and Glode (2011) .
These findings hold not only at the aggregate level but also at the portfolio level.
Sorting funds by prior-year return into decile portfolios along the lines of Carhart (1997), we find that option-adjusted alphas for the ten deciles are not statistically different from zero. Moreover, the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken test pvalue=99%) suggests that the option-adjusted alphas for ten decile portfolios are jointly equal to zero.
In terms of the bottom line, our findings imply that professional managers, as a group, are covering their costs rather than destroying value. This inference starkly contrasts with Jensen (1968) and many subsequent studies. Recently Fama and French (2010) find that the typical fund investor loses, on average, 9 basis points per month relative to the Carhart four-factor benchmark. French (2008) further argues that the investor's expected return increases by 5 basis points per month if a switch is made from active to passive funds.
In this spirit, we join a growing literature showing the importance of more deeply understanding how investors perceive the costs and benefits of a manager's services.
For instance, Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) use the capital flows into and out of mutual funds to reveal the preferences of mutual fund investors. We provide direct evidence that conditional performance in bear states plays an important role in adding value to the actively managed mutual fund industry. As such, unconditional negative alphas relative to passive benchmarks do not necessarily imply that fund investors have suffered significant welfare losses, or that investors do not want to invest in those funds, or that index funds should be overwhelmingly preferred. 4 This study contributes to the existing literature along the following dimensions. First, our results support the equilibrium theories of Berk and Green (2004) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) . Mutual fund managers in theory should collect and analyze information up to the point where the marginal benefit of this activity just meets the marginal cost, but no more. The finding in this paper-that the extra benefit that active management provides in bear states offsets its cost at the aggregate level-is consistent with their equilibrium theory. The model by Glode (2011) points out that the positive 4 Ferson and Lin (2014) offer a comprehensive discussion on the problem of using unconditional alphas. correlation between the active return and the pricing kernel-which unconditional alphas omit-can cause serious underestimation of the value added by active management. Our findings offer direct empirical support to Glode's (2011) theoretical model, which predicts that after accounting for the option value that mutual fund managers provide, the typical investor should be indifferent with respect to the choice of investing in active or passive mutual funds.
Second, we develop and implement an option-based estimation method based on stylized facts as shown in Moskowitz (2000) and Kosowski (2011) . The results are consistent with recent empirical literature arguing that the value of managers' skill equals the value added by what his fund extracts from markets (e.g. Berk and Green (2004) Pastor and Stambaugh, 2012; Berk and Van Binsbergen, 2015; and Pastor, Stambaugh and Taylor, 2015) .
Finally, this paper provides new evidence on performance at the frequency of market cycles. Moskowitz (2000) , and Kosowski (2011) document that in bad times, the average annualized alphas of mutual funds are 3% to 6% higher than those in good times.
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Glode (2011) demonstrates that a fund manager can generate a state-dependent active return (i.e., a positive alpha) in bad times. Whereas these results are attributed to selectivity skill, we show that the manager's bear market timing skill plays the dominant role in generating state-dependent outperformance. Two recent studies, by Koijen (2010) and Kacperczyk, Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) , also provide evidence that the average fund performance is counter-cyclical-but they take very 5 Two recent studies, by Koijen (2010) and Kacperczyk, Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) , also provide evidence that the average fund performance is counter-cyclical-but they take very different perspectives. For example, Kojien focuses on developing a structural approach and KNV use the state of business cycle variable to predict attention allocation. different perspectives. While the former focuses on developing a structural approach, that latter uses the state of business cycle variables to predict attention allocation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, performance benchmarks and the conditional measure of managers' market timing and stock selection skills. Section 3 presents the conditional valuation formula and calculates the option value of bear market timing skill. Section 4 introduces the construction of option-adjusted returns and the estimates of option-adjusted alphas relative to popular passive benchmarks. Section 5 concludes.
Data and Definitions

Sample
Monthly net fund returns, assets under management (AUM) data, and quarterly or semiannual fund data such as investment objectives, percentages of stock holdings and fees are obtained from the CRSP Survivorship-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database. The sample period is from January 1986 to September 2010. The process used in this study to identify domestic equity mutual funds follows Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008) and French (2008) . Lipper, Strategic Insight and Weisenberger investment objective codes are used to identify domestic equity funds. As fund objective codes are missing over certain sample periods-and they sometimes conflict with each other-we follow French (2008) and check the character strings of fund names for keywords suggesting whether the fund is an index fund, ETF, international fund or bond fund and exclude these funds. Following previous literature, also excluded are funds with less than 70% or more than 105% average proportions invested in equities. 6 In order to eliminate incubation bias (Evans, 2010), we include only those funds with AUM greater than $5 million (in 2008 USD). Further, Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992) demonstrate that survivorship bias has an important impact on empirical tests of asset pricing models. In order to control for survivorship bias but also to ensure enough observations to estimate alphas, we stipulate that all funds in the sample must have at least eight months of observations. This coincides with Fama and French (2010) . Observations of all share classes of the respective funds are aggregated each month to generate one observation.
The sample includes 3,731 distinct U.S. domestic equity funds and 443,197 fund-month observations from January 1986 to September 2010.
We also need information on fund gross returns. Since CRSP only reports fund net returns, monthly fund gross returns are formed by remitting 1/12 of the annual expense ratio (Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng 2008) . As missing expense ratios are common in the CRSP database, any missing expense ratios are replaced with the following alternatives: if a fund had expense ratio data before and/or after the missing ratio year, then its nearest expense ratio is used instead; if the fund's expense ratios are all missing, then the average expense ratio of funds of the same size group in the same year is used.
This process is similar to the approach taken in Cohen, Coval and Pastor (2005) . 6 We note that excluding these funds in fact may exclude a number of genuine market timers. Our results on manager's bear market timing skills could be stronger if including these funds. In order to be comparable with previous results, here we follow the general practice in recent studies. 7 Annual CPI data from the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics were used to deflate the dollar value.
Finally, historical option prices are needed, in order to compute the value of the fund manager's bear market timing skill. Since the historical S&P 500 index option data from Option Metrics are available only from January 1996, we use the CBOE volatility index (VIX) data from January 1986 to September 2010 to back up the one-period European index option price. We perform random checks and confirm that the data from both databases are consistent.
Definitions of Bear Market States
Wealth changes of mutual fund investors are quite directly related to financial market conditions. The main interest in our paper is to evaluate funds' conditional performance-the managers' ability to deliver performance when investors need it the most. The emphasis therefore is on down states in aggregate market performance.
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To capture serious market conditions, we define that a "Bear-6" state occurs when the monthly market excess returns for the previous 1, 3 and 6 months are negative. For robustness purposes, we consider two other sets of market state definitions: first, a Bear-12 state (identified when the averaged market excess returns for the past 1, 3, 6 and 12 months are all negative); and second, a CGH-Bear-6 state defined when the market return over the past six months is negative, as in Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004) .
[Insert Table 1 here] 8 The NBER definition of recessions and expansions is not employed as the market state variable in this study for following two reasons. First, this study aims to investigate manager's performance under serious market conditions and to link with the marginal utility of fund investors. Financial market typically picks up 3 to 6 months before the recession ends. Mutual fund investors' wealth is more closely related with financial markets. So recession does not necessarily imply the higher marginal utility of mutual fund investors. Second, as the NBER definitions are often reported 6 months later after the real recession or expansion time, it may not be suitable for our conditional measures which are designed to evaluate performance conditional on market states and draw inferences for investment decisions. in bear states, which is compared with an average return of 0.63% (t-stat=2.36) in nonbear states. For brevity, the rest of the study employs Bear-6 as the main state variable in the following tests, and our results remain robust using the CGH-Bear-6 and Bear-12 definitions.
Benchmarks and Measures
The four-factor model of Carhart (1997)  implies market timing ability.
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As this study aims to evaluate managers' state-dependent performance as well as the economic implications of that performance on the value of active management, along the lines of Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Glode (2011), we implement the following conditional four-factor model to justify fund managers' market timing and stock selection skills across market states: 
Detecting and Accounting for Bear Market Timing Skill
In the Merton (1981) model, a "perfect market timer" adjusts his or her market exposures to be in the market only before a rise, thus earning either the market excess return (if positive) or zero excess return (otherwise). The value of perfect market timing should thus be equal to the market price of the respective one-period call option.
Consequently, Merton (1981) proposes the following formula with which to evaluate a fund manager's selection skill and the value of his or her market timing ability identified in Henriksson and Merton (1981) :
where C HM is the value of an European call option on the market index with striking price reflecting risk-free return 1 f R  , and , i HM  is fund i's exposure to the Henriksson and Merton timing measure, and f R is the risk-free rate.
Market States and Volatility
The CBOE volatility index, called VIX, is a popular measure of market volatility obtained from S&P 500 index options. The VIX data go back to January 1986. We use monthly VIX data to compute the price of a one-month call option on the S&P 500 index with current underlying price normalized to one and strike price of 1 f R  .
11
[Insert Table 2 here]
As shown in Table 2 , market volatility implied volatility, as measured by VIX, is higher in our defined bear market states. This means the potential value of timing skill is higher during those states, other things equal. By specifically estimating its effect, we hope to deepen our understanding on the value of active management.
A New Value Decomposition
We augment formulation (4) as follows, to separate out bear-market specific timing: Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) point out that the "timing adjusted" alpha itself may not be a reliable measure of manager performance, as it might suffer from negative correlation with the timing coefficients.
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More recently, Aragon (2005) shows that if the option value of the market timing is incorporated in the total performance measure (timing plus selectivity), then it is an unbiased estimate of the fund manager's skill.
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12 Dybvig and Ross (1985) show that a manager who is a good market timer can generate a negative alpha. Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ivkovic (2000) show that the classic HM measure of market timing skill is biased downward when applied to the monthly returns of a daily timer. Edelen (1999), however, provides evidence that monthly fund flows have a negative impact on the monthly timing measures. Further, Bollen and Busse (2001) argue that the redemption cash flows may drive the timing coefficients downwards. Most recently, Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel and Welch (2007) demonstrate that performance measures can be "gamed" to generate positive alphas through 'informationless' trading.
13 Hubner (2010) shows that using the option replication approach of Merton (1981) significantly helps to 'clarify the role of market timing in the generation of performance'.
Option-Based Value of Bear Market Timing Skill
To see if our approach can work, we must start from a conditional timing exposure for each manager. The AUM-weighted average exposure across all funds is plotted as a time series in Figure 1A . Combining this with the index option value in bear states, shown in Figure 1B , we then can obtain as product an overall option-based estimate of bear market timing skill value, shown in Figure 1C . The average value in Figure 1C Further, the density kernel of the t-statistics of alphas is negatively skewed to the left. In contrast, the density kernel of the t-statistics of the conditional bear state timing coefficient is clearly positively skewed to the theoretical normal distribution with mean of zero.
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 3 here]
To further examine the generality of bear market timing skill and its economic significance cross-sectionally, we divide mutual funds into ten deciles according to their full sample unconditional Carhart four-factor alphas. Notably, as shown in the last column of Table 3 , the cross-sectional average of the option value of bear market timing is 4.8 basis points (t-statistics=2.3) per month, which is both economically and statistically significant. Note that negative-alpha funds from deciles 1 to 6 all have average positive bear market timing performance-although the pattern is not monotonic.
The evidence of average positive bear market timing, together with its economic and statistical significance in the cross-sections of those traditionally classified "unskilled" funds, present important challenges to the validation of classic measures. The above findings seem to suggest that active managers on average (cross-sectionally) are able to deliver the value when investors need it the most. Recognizing the value of the fund manager's option-based performance in bear states, the next section of the paper explores the time-series importance and economic implications of this skill with regard to the value of the actively managed mutual fund industry.
The Value of the Actively Managed Mutual Fund Industry
The previous section reported that active mutual fund managers on average are able to deliver positive conditional performance (especially positive market timing coefficient) in bear states over our sample period, and we apply Merton's (1981) valuation formula to compute the value of manager's conditional selection and market timing skills. In line with recent theoretical literature (Glode, 2011), we refer the value of manager's conditional selection and timing skills as the value of a free portfolio insurance, which helps investors to mitigate losses in bear market states. As this premium is not fully reflected in funds' returns, we create option-adjusted returns to examine to what extend the option premium of manager's conditional performance is economically important at the aggregate level, and to what extend we could use this option premium to justify their appeared overall underperformance.
The Option-based Approach
Section 3.2 demonstrates that our conditional performance measure includes two components: conditional selectivity (i.e., conditional alpha) and bear market timing skills. Bear Timing Value equals to the conditional timing coefficient times the price of a one-period European call option on the market portfolio with a strike price on the drift path of the risk-free rate. The value of conditional selectivity equals the conditional alpha in bear market states.
Recall that we refer to the value of a manager's conditional performance as the value of a free portfolio insurance offered by an active manager, which reveals the extra premium gained or lost by fund investors in bear market states. The sum total of the option value of bear timing skill and conditional alpha thus offers an estimate of the price that investors are willing to pay for this portfolio insurance. More specifically, for a manager with positive bear market performance, the value of manager's conditional performance is positive. Investors of such funds seem to own a free portfolio insurance (or free European option) to protect them in bear market states, and the insurance (option) premium reflect the price for this protection. Similarly, for the manager with poor performance (i.e., negative skills) in bear states, the value of conditional performance may reflect the negative premium that the manager fails to deliver in bad times.
14 In order to estimate the economic impact of managers' conditional performance at the aggregate level, we first construct the option-adjusted (in other words, optionpremium-adjusted) return time series for each mutual fund in our sample to incorporate the value of the "free insurance" provided by managers' bear state performance. The first step is to test the manager's conditional timing and selectivity skills in bear market states. To that end, we perform sixty-month rolling regressions as the equation 3 in Section 2.3 from month t -59 to t) for each fund. If a fund has fewer than 60 months of observations, its full sample is used instead.
14 An easier way to understand this is that one dollar in bad times might be worth more than one dollar in good times, since investors' marginal utility is high in bad times. However, in our paper, we use option valuation approach (the non-arbitrage) way to demonstrate rather than using an utility function.
There are at least three merits of using a 5-year rolling window. First, it ensures that there are enough observations in bear states to estimate the conditional selection and timing coefficient, since there are only 48 months in total in such states. Second, the 5-year evaluation window helps to reflect mutual fund investor's overall welfare level within a reasonable medium-term investment horizon, which has been widely used by fund-rating agencies such as Morningstar. Third, the relatively long-rolling window estimation may better capture the dynamics of fund managers' conditional performance as well as the factor loadings. Nonetheless, for robustness, we also use 3-year rolling window regressions and our findings remain hold.
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More specifically, we use the following procedure to construct the option-adjusted time series returns for each fund in the sample in order to incorporate the option premium into fund returns.
1)
We use mutual fund net returns (MRET, hereafter) to perform rolling regressions as equation (1), (2) and (3) of Section 2.3 to obtain the coefficient estimates, including the conditional market timing coefficient λ i . 
2) To reflect the option premium of managers' bear market performance, we construct the option-adjusted return series by replacing the intuitive as we could interpret that we now price the portfolio insurance (or put option), 15 The result using a 3-year rolling window is available upon request. 16 As the option and Implied Volatility data are only available since 1986, we estimate the Option-based Total Performance for mutual funds from 1986 to 2010.
which was not previously priced in fund return series. If we use the Carhart-four-factor model as the passive benchmark, the detailed formation of the option-adjusted returns is shown as below. 
where , R OptionAdj t is the option-adjusted returns at month t for fund i.
3)
We repeat the procedures above to create the option-adjusted return time series , R OptionAdj t for each of the 3,731 funds in the sample period from 1986 to 2010.
4)
We regress the option-adjusted return series on popular passive benchmarks (such as CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart benchmarks). For example, if we use the Carhart-four-factor benchmark, we run the following regression:
Thus far, the option-adjusted return time series reflects the premium that investors have gained or lost in bear market states, which is captured in historical option prices.
Therefore, the intercepts from the regressions of the option-adjusted return series on popular passive benchmarks (such as CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart benchmarks) enables us to evaluate the significance of the option values at the aggregate level.
Further, we define the intercepts obtained from the regressions of the option-adjusted returns as the option-adjusted alphas. Comparing the option-adjusted alphas with the traditional unconditional alphas allows for the insights into the economic value of the option premium provided by active mutual fund managers. Moskowitz (2000) and 17 There is controversy about whether the factor returns (such as size, value or momentum in the four factor model) are results of mispricing or valid asset pricing model to reflect rewards for risk. Following Fama and French (2010), here we interpret the factors as passive benchmarks which could capture patterns in average returns during our sample period, despite the sources of average returns.
Glode (2011) show that the classic performance measure underestimates the value added by active management since the performance in bad times is given equivalent weights as the performance in good times. In our case, the option-adjusted alpha sheds some lights on the underestimated value of the active managed mutual fund industry in bad times. Table 4 compares the traditional and option-adjusted alphas using the CAPM, FamaFrench and Carhart passive benchmarks for both equal-and value-weighted portfolios of the U.S. equity mutual funds in our sample. Regarding value weighting, gross and net fund returns are weighted by assets under management (AUM) at the beginning of each month.
Aggregate Results
[Insert Table 4 is −0.08% per month (t-statistics=−2.78), which is less than zero with statistical significance. From an equilibrium accounting perspective, Fama and French (2010) argue that the significantly negative alpha indicates that the actively managed mutual fund industry does not cover the cost that they impose on investors.
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However, after accounting for the option value offered by managers' bear state performance, the option-adjusted alpha using Carhart model increases to −0.05% (t-statistics=−1.59), and more importantly, it becomes statistically insignificant from zero.
The option-adjusted alphas using either the CAPM or Fama-French three-factor benchmarks show the same pattern. Importantly, that the aggregate level optionadjusted alphas (after fees) are close to zero provides important empirical support to Glode's (2011) equilibrium model. The Glode's model predicts that investors should be indifferent from active and passive funds once accounting for the benefit offered by managers' state-dependent performance.
Indeed, as long as the factor models can be served as passive benchmarks, our evidence suggests that the benefit of the service provided by the actively managed mutual fund industry could compensate for its cost to a large degree. Our findings at the aggregate level are consistent with the equilibrium theory of Grossman and Stiglitz analysis also provides insights on rationalizing the underperformance and mutual fund industry size puzzles well-documented in the previous literature.
Fund Portfolio Results
Could our findings obtained at the fund portfolio level be consistent with those produced at the aggregate level? Along the lines of Carhart (1997) , this section examines this question using the subsets of mutual funds. Carhart sorts funds into ten decile portfolios using lagged one-year returns. He finds that even the top two deciles with highest past returns fail to outperform the four-factor benchmark.
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The other eight deciles all generate statistically significant negative four-factor alphas. Carhart's results 19 In Carhart (1997) , the returns of deciles portfolios 1 and 2 are, respectively, -0.12% (t-stat=-1.60) and -0.10% (t-stat=-1.78) per month from 1963 to 1993.
are often regarded as evidence of mutual fund underperformance at the portfolio level; it might be interesting to investigate whether our results remain robust using fund portfolios.
[Insert Table 5 here] The last row of Table 5 reports the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (GRS) statistic and its pvalue. The null hypothesis of the GRS test is that all alphas for all ten deciles are jointly equal to zero, which is not rejected in all cases. For example, the GRS statistic is 0.52 with p-value of 0.99 in the sixth column, which suggests that the option-adjusted alphas using the Carhart benchmark for all decile portfolios are jointly equal to zero.
All above evidence highlights that the benefit of the service offered by active managers in bad times is economically significant, and it could largely offset the cost of active management at both the portfolio and the aggregate levels. These evidence indicates that negative alphas relative to passive benchmarks does not necessarily imply that active mutual fund management does not deliver value, or that the investor's overall welfare could largely increase if he or she moved to passive funds.
Decomposition Analysis: Selectivity or Timing?
In the preceding sections, we find that after recognizing the option value of managers' conditional performance in bear states, the option-adjusted alpha (after fees) turns out to be zero. Recall that the option-adjusted alpha is used to measure fund investors' average excess welfare of their investment, compared with the passive
benchmarks. An interesting question arises: what is the driving force that generates the insurance value in bear states?
[Insert Table 6 here] Table 6 performs a decomposition analysis to examine the impact of the conditional timing and selectivity skills separately on adjusted alphas. We find that the bear market timing skills of mutual fund managers play a vital role in delivering value when investors need it most. Specifically, the second, third and fourth columns of Table 6 report the option-adjusted alphas by incorporating 1) only the extra value delivered by fund managers' bear market timing skill; 2) only the extra value delivered by fund managers' bear market selectivity; and 3) the extra insurance value delivered created by both fund managers' bear market timing and selectivity skills, respectively. Note that the option-adjusted alphas in the second column -which only incorporates the extra utility that investors gain from manager's bear market timing skill -are all greater than the alphas that are reported in the third and fourth columns. This finding suggests that the Bear Timing Value contributes positively to the total value reported in column 4.
The previous studies (e.g., Kosowski 2011) document that mutual fund's performance looks much better during bad states of the economy and that they tend to attribute this part of outperformance to fund managers' stock selection skill during the bear states. The above decomposition analysis using VW and EW portfolios, however, suggests that it is the fund managers' bear market timing skill that is the main source to the better conditional performance-or, what is also known as the insurance value provided by the actively managed mutual fund industry in bear states.
Robustness Checks
A potential question is whether our results are robust to the inclusion of both bull and bear state variables or the use of the other market state definitions. This subsection defines a bull state variable equal to 1 when the monthly market excess returns of the previous past 1, 3 and 6 months are nonnegative, while a bear state is defined when the monthly market excess returns of the previous 1, 3, 6 months are all negative. Following the same logic in Section 3.2, the total value of fund manager's conditional performance is simply equal to the sum total of the following four parts: the option value of bear-and bull market timing, and the value of selectivity in bear-and bull markets.
The procedure described in Section 4.1 is used to take account of the extra utility or disutility created by a manager's bear and bull market performance to create the optionadjusted-returns series. Appendix 3 reports option-adjusted alphas of ten mutual fund portfolios using option-adjusted-returns sorted by lagged one-year returns, in the line with Carhart (1997) . Notably, the alphas in all of the decile portfolios are very smalland none are statistically significant. This pattern is almost identical to that reported in Table 4 . It indicates that including the fund manager's performance in both bear-and bull states has negligible impact on our results.
Finally, we perform robustness checks using the market state definitions in Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004) . As reported in Appendix 4, however, our result remains robust using that methodology. None of the Carhart four-factor option-adjusted alphas is statistically significantly less than zero.
Conclusion
Mutual fund underperformance, as evidenced by negative aggregate average alphas, has been widely documented in the mutual fund literature, literature that seems to suggest that investing in the actively managed mutual funds destroys value-and could even be considered as irrational from an investor's point of view. We examine the economic implication and the impact of fund managers' conditional performance in bear market states on the value of the active management.
Our analysis shows that this option-like benefit can be large enough to compensate for other drawbacks of active management, at both aggregate and portfolio levels.
Lower unconditional performance numbers go away when we add in our estimates of the real-time option values in the sample. This study offers a significant counterpoint to the view that the cost of active management far exceeds its benefits, and that mutual fund investors would become much better off by switching to passive funds. Figure 1A illustrates the time series of the value-weighted estimate of bear market timing coefficient λ i in equation 3 using 60-month rolling-window regressions in the sample period 1986 to 2010. Figure 1B plots the time series of the historical prices of an one-month European call option on the S&P 500 index with its current level normalized to one and a strike price of 1 ft R  . Figure   1C . To obtain the bear market timing coefficients, we first perform rolling regressions (3) for each individual fund in our sample to obtain the intercepts i  , i  as well as loadings i  , i  as described in Section 4.1. Then lagged total asset under management (AUM) is used to calculate the value weighted value for each month t. Performance. The value of bear state timing is as a timing exposure coefficient times a call option price in bear states. A bear state is defined when the average market excess returns of the previous 1, 3 and 6 months are all negative. A theoretical Normal distribution is drawn using mean of zero and estimated variance. All density functions are estimated using a Gaussian kernel and the bandwidth choice of Silverman (1986). 
Performance
Mutual funds are assigned into ten deciles by their full-sample Carhart four-factor alphas. All numbers are cross-sectional averages of all funds in each decile. Each fund is evaluated over its entire existing period between 1986 and 2010. 4-factor alpha refers to unconditional four-factor adjusted alpha. Bear Timing Value refers to the conditional timing component of Equation (5), which equals to the conditional timing coefficient times the averaged option price in bear states. A bear market state is defined when the monthly market excess returns of the previous 1, 3 and 6 months are negative.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Bear Market States
A Bear-6 market state is defined when the monthly market excess returns of the previous 1, 3 and 6 months are negative, whereas a non-bear-6 market state is defined when the monthly market excess returns of the previous 1, 3 and 6 months are non-negative. We use Bear-6 as our main state variable. For robustness, we also consider the following definitions. A Bear-12 state is identified when the monthly market excess returns for the past 1, 3, 6 and 12 months are negative; whereas a non-bear-12 state is identified when the monthly market excess returns for the past 1, 3, 6 and 12 months are non-negative. Following Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004) , a CGH Bear-6 state is defined when the monthly market excess return of the past 6 months is negative whereas a CGH Bear-6 state is defined when the monthly market excess return. A CGH Bear-12 state is defined when the past 12-month market excess return is negative. The period is from January 1986 to September 2010, 279 months in total. Mutual funds are assigned into ten deciles by their full-sample Carhart four-factor alphas. All numbers are cross-sectional averages of all funds in each decile. Each fund is evaluated over its entire existing period between January 1986 and September 2010. 4-factor alpha refers to unconditional four-factor adjusted alpha. HM value is computed as the sum total of unconditional alpha and the option value of unconditional market timing using Equation (4). Option-based Total Performance is computed using Equation (5) described in Section 3.2, where it adds up the following: the option value of manager's bear market timing, the value of selectivity in bear states, the unconditional selection and option value of unconditional timing. Bear Timing Value refers to the conditional timing component of Equation (5), which equals to the conditional timing coefficient times the averaged option price in bear states. A bear state is defined when the monthly market excess returns of the previous 1, 3 and 6 months are negative. To ensure comparability and compute conditional timing coefficients, we require funds in the sample to have at least seven observations in bear states between January 1986 and September 2010. The sample involves 3,342 funds. ** and * stand for statistical significance (Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent t-stat estimates under the null that the coefficient estimates are equal to zero) at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Following Carhart (1997) , on January 1 st of each year from 1986 to 2010, mutual funds are sorted into decile portfolios according to the prior-year returns. The option-adjusted alphas are computed using the option-adjusted-returns, which accounts for the option value of fund managers' bear market skills. A bear state is defined when the averaged market excess returns of the previous 1, 3 and 6 months are all negative. The VW portfolios are weighted using the end of last calendar year's total assets under management (AUM). The decile 1 portfolio consists of funds with the highest lagged one-year returns, and the decile 10 portfolio includes funds with the lowest lagged one-year returns. The figures under the coefficients are the Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent t-stat estimates under the null that the coefficient estimates are equal to zero. The last row reports the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (GRS) statistics and the p-value. The null hypothesis of the GRS test is that all alphas for ten deciles are jointly equal to zero. This table compares option-adjusted alphas by incorporating different skill components. The optionadjusted alphas are relative to the CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart benchmarks for VW and EW portfolios of the 3,731 mutual funds in our sample. The period is from January 1986 to September 2010. The option-adjusted alpha is computed in the way which is described in Section 4.1. Column 2 reports option-adjusted alphas that only incorporate the insurance value (the option value) delivered by fund managers' market timing skill in bear states. Column 3 reports option-adjusted alphas that only consider the extra value created by fund managers' selectivity in bear states. Column 4 reports option-adjusted alphas that incorporate the extra value created by both bear market timing and selectivity skills of fund managers. A bear state is defined when the average monthly market excess returns of the previous 1, 3 and 6 months are all negative. The VW portfolios are weighted using the end of last calendar year's total assets under management (AUM). The EW portfolios are equally weighted monthly. The figures under the coefficients are the Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent t-stat estimates under the null that the coefficient estimates are equal to zero. The up figure compares the return pattern (after fees) of a typical equity mutual fund, which is often referred to as exemplifying a lack of selection and market timing skills, with the returns of the market portfolio from 1986 to 2010. The monthly returns of the market portfolio are obtained from Ken French's website. The down figure compares the returns of the value-weighted U.S. equity mutual fund portfolio with the returns of the market portfolio from 1986 to 2010. The fund portfolio includes 3,731 funds which existed during the period January 1986 to September 2010. The returns of the market portfolio are obtained from Ken French's website. To ensure comparability, the asset under management (AUM) is used as the weight to calculate the VW returns of the U.S. equity mutual fund portfolio. Carhart (1997) using VW portfolios. Mutual funds are on January 1 st of each year from 1986 to 2010 sorted on into decile portfolios according to the prior-year returns. The VW portfolios are weighted using the end of the last calendar year's total assets under management (AUM). The decile 1 portfolio consists of funds with the highest lagged one-year return, and the decile 10 portfolio includes funds with the lowest lagged one-year return. The figures under the coefficients are the Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent t-statistics under the null that the coefficient estimates are equal to zero. The last row reports the GibbonsRoss-Shanken (GRS) statistics and the p-value. The null hypothesis of the GRS test is that all alphas for ten decile portfolios are jointly equal to zero. Following Carhart (1997) , on January 1 st of each year from 1986 to 2010, mutual funds are sorted into decile portfolios according to the prior-year returns. The option-adjusted alphas are computed using the option-adjusted-returns, which accounts for the option value (the option value of conditional performance), provided by fund managers' bear and bull market skills. Section 4.1 provides more detail on creating the option-adjusted-returns series. Bull and bear states are defined when the average monthly market excess returns of the previous 1, 3 and 6 months are all positive or negative, respectively. The VW portfolios are weighted using the end of the last calendar year's total assets under management (AUM). The decile 1 portfolio consists of funds with the highest lagged one-year returns, and the decile 10 portfolio includes funds with the lowest lagged one-year returns. The figures under the coefficients are the Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent t-statistics under the null that the coefficient estimates are equal to zero. The last row reports the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (GRS) statistics and the p-value. The null hypothesis of the GRS test is that all alphas for ten deciles are jointly equal to zero. Mutual funds are sorted on January 1 st of each year from 1986 to 2010 into decile portfolios according to the return of the previous calendar year. The option-adjusted alphas are computed using the option-adjusted-returns time series, which accounts for the option premium provided by fund managers' bear state performance. Following Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004) , a Bear-6 (CGH) state is defined when the past six-month market excess returns are negative. See Section 4.1 for detailed descriptions on how to create the option-adjusted-returns series. The EW portfolios are equally weighted monthly. The decile 1 portfolio consists of funds with the highest lagged one-year return and the decile 10 portfolio includes funds with the lowest lagged one-year return. The figures under the coefficients are the Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent t-statistics under the null that the coefficient estimates are equal to zero. 
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